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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920360-CA 
v. : 
DENNIS WAYNE SHUFFLER, : Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to six 
counts of Unlawful Dealing with Property by a Fiduciary, a 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (1990) , and three counts of 
Diversion or Appropriation of Insurance Funds, a violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-23-310(6) (1992). All counts were second degree 
felonies. The trial court sentenced defendant to serve nine 
consecutive 1 to 15 year terms of imprisonment. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court fail to consider the defendant's 
history, character and rehabilitative needs during the sentencing 
hearing. 
The standard of review is that an appellate court will 
not set aside a sentence imposed within statutorily prescribed 
1 
limits, unless the trial court's sentence is either clearly 
excessive or an abuse of discretion, State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 
885, 887 (Utah 1978), or unless the trial court fails to consider 
all legally relevant factors, State v. Holland. 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 
1989) . An abuse of discretion may be manifest if the actions of 
the judge in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if it can be 
said that no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the 
court. Gerrard. 584 P.2d at 887-888. 
2. Did the court abuse its discretion by sentencing the 
defendant to serve the statutorily prescribed maximum of nine 
consecutive 1 to 15 year terms of imprisonment? 
The standard of review is that enunciated under 1., 
above. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The statutory provisions and rules upon which the State 
relies are included in appendix of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information on February 20, 1992 with 
six counts of Unlawful Dealing with Property by a Fiduciary, and 
three counts of Diversion or Appropriation of Insurance Funds, §§ 
76-6-513 and 31A-23-310(6). All counts were second degree 
felonies. 
On March 4, 1992, pursuant to a plea negotiation contained in 
the "Statement of Defendant" (R. 21-29), defendant entered pleas of 
guilty to each of the nine counts charged in the information. 
After the preparation of a presentence report, defendant appeared 
2 
for a sentencing hearing on April 29, 1992. Upon conclusion of the 
hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve nine 1 to 15 
year terms of imprisonment. The court ordered that all terms run 
consecutively. A final judgment was entered in the Sixth Judicial 
District Court for Sanpete County, State of Utah, on May 28, 1992 
(R. 40-41). 
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on June 4, 1992. The 
present appeal challenges the sentence imposed as excessive, 
alleging abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At the time of sentencing, defendant was 41 years old (R. 46, 
hereinafter, Tr. 22), and had lived in the Manti area of Sanpete 
County since he was a young boy (Tr. 25-26) . He was employed as a 
police officer in the community for five years (Tr. 8, 28) . During 
the time in which the offenses occurred, defendant was self-
employed as an insurance agent, a tax adviser, and was trusted by 
victims as an investment counselor (Tr. 9, 19-21, 22, 27). 
Defendant represented to victims that he could invest their 
money in insurance annuities, life insurance policies, TELCO (a 
telephone company), and living trusts (Tr. 14, 17, 19, & 20). 
Defendant did not invest the victim's money as he had represented 
(Tr. 10-27) . Large amounts of money were entrusted to him to make 
these investments. The amounts varied from approximately $20,000 
to $115,000 (Tr. 12, 17, & 21). Several of the victims were 
widowed and elderly (Tr. 12, 21, & 26). In some cases, the monies 
invested by victims represented life savings or retirement funds 
2 
(Tr. 17, 26). 
In order to create the appearance that monies were invested as 
defendant had represented to his client/victims, defendant paid 
some of the victims monthly interest payments (Tr. 10# 33). 
Defendant also used investment monies and insurance funds for 
business expenses and seminars (Tr. 11, 25) . The offenses 
committed by defendant occurred over approximately a seven year 
period (Tr. 15). Because defendant never placed these funds into 
requested insurance policies or annuities, or invested in any of 
the proposed entities, the monies were eventually exhausted (Tr. 
10-11). 
After the funds were depleted, several victims began asking 
defendant what held happened to their money (Tr. 12-13) . One of the 
victim's daughters-in-law made a complaint to the Sheriff's 
Department and later told defendant that she was going to the 
authorities (Tr. 13) . Defendant eventually gave information to 
investigators regarding the diverted client-funds and was charged 
with the offenses which support the sentence at issue (Tr. 27-28). 
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged that 
it had read the presentence report (Tr. 3, 13, 41). Adult 
Probation & Parole (AP&P) recommended in the report that defendant 
serve nine consecutive terms (Tr. 7, 29) . The court also indicated 
that it had read the victims' statements in the presentence report 
(Tr. 13) . The court heard the sentencing recommendations of the 
State and defendant's counsel, and listened to defendant's 
statement (Tr. 5, 27, 32). Six victims and defendant's ex-wife 
A 
also made statements to the court (Tr. 10) At the conclusion of 
the sentencing hearing, the court imposed the maximum term of 
incarceration prescribed by statute, and explained to defendant the 
reason for the sentence (Tr. 41) . The court stated the following: 
The sentences will run consecutively, Mr. Shuffler. I 
am intending to impose the maximum penalty and I do impose 
the maximum penalty, as I can. And I want to explain to 
you the reason why I do that, for your benefit and for the 
benefit of the victims. 
From what I have seen in the presentence report and 
what I have heard from you today leads me to conclude that 
you are not a trustworthy person. And the glue that binds 
a community together is the belief that we all have that [sic] 
we can trust each other and that most people will be obedient, 
and you violated that trust on behalf of these people who are 
here today. 
And what you've told me about your bankruptcy proceedings 
concerns me because you're telling me that you have not been 
honest with the Bankruptcy Court. And you're required to do 
that in order to get a surcharge [sic] from the Bankruptcy 
Court and your comments lead me to believe that you're still 
not a trustworthy person, inspite [sic] of what's happened to 
you so far. 
(Tr.41-42). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court exercised proper discretion in sentencing 
defendant to serve the maximum term prescribed. Defendant was 
afforded a fair opportunity to express his position both orally and 
in writing. Defendant made statements to AP&P which were provided 
to the court in the presentence report. The court also considered 
defendant's oral statement in court, wherein defendant disagreed 
with some of the recommendations made by victims and the 
prosecution. 
The court considered substantial information regarding 
defendant's history, character and rehabilitative needs. The court 
£ 
heard statements that defendant was well known; that he had lived 
in the community since he was a young boy; that he was a former 
police officer; and, that he was highly respected and trusted in 
the community prior to these offenses. 
The court considered alternative means of punishment, 
restitution and rehabilitation. Defendant stated that he could pay 
restitution to all of the victims. Defendant's counsel recommended 
that defendant be sentenced in such a way as to provide for 
restitution to the victims. 
The record demonstrates that the trial court objectively 
considered all of the information provided in the presentence 
report and at the sentencing hearing. The sentence was imposed 
within statutory limitations, was not inherently unfair, excessive 
or an abuse of the court's discretion, and was justified by the 
evidence, history and circumstances presented to the court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED DEFENDANT'S 
HISTORY, CHARACTER AND REHABILITATIVE NEEDS 
DURING THE SENTENCING HEARING. 
Defendant argues that the court abused its discretion by 
failing to consider defendant's history, character and 
rehabilitative needs. The record does not support defendant's 
argument. 
An abuse of discretion may occur where the actions of the 
sentencing court are inherently unfair. Gerrard. 584 P.2d at 887-
£ 
888 • The statutory factors the court is to consider in determining 
whether to impose consecutive sentences are "the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 
(2). 
In the instant case, the court considered information from a 
lengthy presentence report. At the sentencing hearing, the court 
heard statements and recommendations from the prosecution, the 
victims, defendant's wife, defendant's attorney, and defendant. 
The following facts were presented at the sentencing hearing: 
1. Defendant was well known and lived in the community 
since he was a young boy (Tr. 25, 28); 
2. Defendant was a missionary and helped one of the victims 
with church activities while he was a juvenile (Tr. 25); 
3. Defendant was charitable in his community (Tr. 25); 
4. Defendant was employed as a police officer in the 
community for approximately five (5) years (Tr. 8, 28); 
5. Defendant worked as an investment counselor and tax 
adviser (Tr. 9, 19-21, 22, 27); 
6. Defendant cooperated with the investigation and provided 
information to the prosecution (Tr. 5, 27, 30); 
7. Defendant believed he had the ability to pay restitution 
to the victims (Tr. 33); 
8. Defendant's wife believed he was trying to pay victims 
back, prior to the charges being filed (Tr. 24); 
9. Defendant represented to client/victims that he would 
2 
invest their monies in TELCO, a living trust, insurance 
policies and annuities (Tr. 14, 17, 18, 20); 
10. Defendant made false representations and diverted the 
funds of client/victims over a period of approximately seven 
(7) years (Tr. 15); 
11. Some of the victims entrusted defendant with their life 
savings (Tr. 14, 17-18, 26); 
12. Many of the victims were elderly and are now unable to 
support themselves due to defendant's diversion (Tr. 16, 17, 
26); and 
13. Defendant had recently filed bankruptcy, and was not 
honest when providing creditor information to the court (Tr. 
42) . 
Although the trial court did not specifically address the 
rehabilitative needs of defendant during the sentencing hearing, it 
is clear that the court considered various punishment alternatives. 
Additionally, it should be presumed that the rehabilitative needs 
of defendant were appropriately considered in the presentence 
report. State v., Eloge. 762 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1988) . In Elocre. the 
supreme court stated that ff[a]bsent a record, this Court presumes 
regularity in the proceedings below.11 762 P.2d at 2 [citing State 
v. Robbins. 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985)]. Since defendant has 
not made the presentence report part of the record, he may not 
claim that the report did not consider rehabilitative factors in 
determining his sentence. 
Because the trial court considered all of the above factors 
& 
and circumstances before imposing defendant's sentence, including 
the information and recommendation contained in the presentence 
report, defendant's sentence does not represent an abuse of 
discretion. 
POINT II 
THE SENTENCE IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS PRESCRIBED BY STATUTE, 
WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND DOES NOT REPRESENT AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Defendant may have believed at his sentencing hearing that the 
court would impose a short term of incarceration and then place him 
on probation. In fact, defendant stated on two occasions during 
the hearing that he was prepared for incarceration, believed 
imprisonment was appropriate, but should not be "the end result" 
(Tr. 33, 34). Defendant also believed that he had the ability to 
pay restitution to the victims if placed on probation (Tr. 34) . 
Nevertheless, the court sentenced defendant to serve the maximum 
sentence possible, nine consecutive 1 to 15 year terms. 
In State v. Clark. 632 P.2d 841 (Utah 1981) , the supreme court 
noted that lenient treatment is sometimes afforded for first time 
offenders, "[b]ut clearly there is no principle recognized in a 
court of law that one who would break the law is entitled to a free 
bite of the apple or to be treated leniently." I£. at 845. 
The matter of sentencing rests entirely within the discretion 
of the trial court, as long as it is imposed within the limits 
prescribed by law. State v. Jolivet. 712 P.2d 843, 887 (Utah 1986) . 
Before an appellate court may overturn a sentence imposed by the 
trial court, "it must be clear that the actions of the judge were 
1 
so inherently unfair as to constitute abuse of discretion." 
Gerrard. 584 P.2d at 887. Any other standard of review would place 
a chilling effect on the trial court. Ibid. 
It appears that the trial court imposed the msLximum sentence 
based on its findings that defendant violated the community's trust 
and remained untrustworthy at the time of sentencing; that many of 
the victims were elderly and as a result of defendant's crimes, 
were no longer aible to support themselves financially; and, that 
many victims would never receive any restitution. Considering 
these factors, the sentence imposed by the trial court was not 
excessive or so clearly unfair as to constitute an abuse of 
discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's sentence in this case. 
DATED this _5r£\ day of December, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
v 
By: ROBERT C. CtJRNEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX 
PUNISHMENTS 76-3-401 
or affected by the con victioi • .. m 
nated media or otherwise. 
(2) When an executive or high managerial officer of a corporation or associ-
ation is convicted of an offense committed in furtherance of the affairs of the 
corporation or association, the court may include in the sentence an order 
disqualifying him from exercising similar functions in the same or other cor-
porations or associations for a period of not exceeding five years if it finds the 
scope or willfulness of his illegal actions make it dangerous or inadvisable for 
such functions to be entrusted to him, 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-303, enacted by L 
1073, ch. 196, § 76-3-303. 
I UH' l iAl HFFF-RENrF'-i 
Key Numbers. — l'run in u I 1 HV. «•' VMH 1I 
PART 4 
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON 
SENTENCES 
tions. 
• roun shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than une felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sen-
tences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently 
unless the court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively. 
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and 
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determin-
ing whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(4) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years' imprisonment. However, this 
limitation does not apply if an offense for which the defendant is sentenced 
authorizes the death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 
(5) The limitation in Subsection (4) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of sentence for any one or more of 
them; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdic-
tion. 
(6) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner in 
which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons shall treat the defendant as 
though he has been committed for a single term that shall consist of the 
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows: 
67 
76-3-401 CRIMINAL CODE 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences rim consecutively, the minimum 
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum 
terms. 
(7) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concur-
rently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser 
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be 
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one 
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served. 
(8) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity 
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(9) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-401, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-401; 1974, ch. 32, § 7; 
1989, ch. 181, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
ment, effective April 24,1989, deleted "Subject 
to the limitations of Subsections (2) through 
(5)" at the beginning of Subsection (1); inserted 
'Tor state offenses" in the second sentence in 
Subsection (1); rewrote the first sentence in 
Subsection (4) which read "If a court lawfully 
determined to impose consecutive sentences, 
the aggregate minimum of all sentences im-
posed may not exceed twelve years' imprison-
ment and the aggregate maximum of all sen-
ANALYSIS 
Commencement of second sentence. 
Consecutive sentences. 
Sentences imposed by different states. 
Commencement of second sentence. 
Sentence upon conviction of second offense 
could not begin later than termination of first; 
court properly sentenced defendant to serve ad-
ditional five years on conviction of perjury, to 
commence upon expiration of life sentence 
which defendant was already serving. State v. 
Dodge, 19 Utah 2d 44, 425 P.2d 781 (1967). 
Consecutive sentences. 
The court did not err in imposing consecutive 
sentences on the defendant for the crimes of 
aggravated kidnapping and sexual assault, 
even though both were committed in the course 
of a single criminal episode, where the evi-
dence clearly showed that a sufficiently sub-
stantial period of time had elapsed, both before 
tences imposed may not exceed thirty years' 
imprisonment"; inserted "a maximum sentence 
of5 before "life imprisonment" at the end of the 
second sentence in Subsection (4); rewrote Sub-
section (61 following "single term" which read 
"with the following incidents, (a) The prison 
term shall consist of the aggregate of the val-
idly imposed prison terms; and (b) The mini-
mum term, if any, shall constitute the aggre-
gate of the validly imposed minimum terms"; 
added Subsections (8) and (9); and made nu-
merous stylistic changes throughout the sec-
tion. 
and after the sexual assault, in which the vic-
tim was restrained against her will and sub-
jected to a substantial risk of harm from the 
defendant's threats and loaded gun. State v. 
Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843 (Utah 1986). 
Trial CDurt did not err in imposing four con-
secutive sentences for second-degree murder, 
attempted murder and two counts of aggra-
vated assault arising out of a barroom alterca-
tion, because defendant committed four sepa-
rate and distinct crimes involving different vic-
tims. State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Ct. App. 
1989). 
Sentences imposed by different states. 
Subsection (1), providing that sentences are 
to run concurrently unless the court states to 
the contrary in the sentence, does not apply to 
sentences imposed by two different sovereigns, 
and, therefore, such sentences should run con-
secutively unless the sentencing court ex-
pressly directs otherwise. State v. Reed, 709 
P.2d 391 (Utah 1985). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY • 1 6 -6 515 
#v Unlawful dealing with property by fiduciary. 
(Ij, ^ person is guilty of theft, punishable under Section 76-6-412, if he 
deals with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property 
of the government or of a financial institution, in a manner which he knows is 
a violation of his duty and which involves substantial risk of loss to the owner 
or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted. 
(2) As used in this section 'fiduciary" includes any person carrying on fidu-
ciary functions on behalf of a corporation or other organization which is a 
fiduciary. "Government" and "financial institution" have the meanings given 
in Section 76-6-411; "property" has the meaning given in Section 76-6-401(1). 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-513, enacted by L. ferred to in Subsection (2), was repeated in 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-513; 1983, ch. 91, * 1. 
Compiler's Notes. — Section 76-6-411, re-
COI LATER i I. I REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Utah's Statute bility: A Guide for Lawyers nil Il lhi*>< Ini '•, 
Permitting Limits on Corporate Directors' Lia- 1988 Utah L. Rev. 847. 
3 6 6 •51IIII i Bi ibc i ' 3 or threat b i influence eoiu« -
A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if: 
(1) With a purpose to influence any participant or prospective partici 
pant not to give his best efforts in a publicly exhibited contest, he confers 
or offers or agrees to confer any benefit upon or threatens any injury to a 
participant or prospective participant; or 
(2) With a purpose to influence an official in a publicly exhibited con-
test to perform his duties improperly, he confers or offers or agrees to 
confer any benefit upon or threatens any injury to such official; or 
(3) With a purpose to influence the outcome of a publicly exhibited 
contest, he tampers with any person, animal, or thing contrary to the 
rules and usages purporting to govern the contest; or 
(4) He knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit, the 
giving of which would be criminal under [Subsection] (1 ) or (2). 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-514, enacted by L, 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-514 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
An. Jur. 2d 12 Am. Jur 2d Brihe' ! S. - 11 C.J.S. Bribery § 2. 
fi I ft ^i mbers Bribery «-» 2 
76-6-515. Using en making slugs. 
(] ) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if: 
(a) With a purpose to defraud the supplier of property or a service 
offered or sold by means of a coin machine, he inserts, deposits, or uses a 
slug in that machine; or 
(b) He makes, possesses, or disposes of a slug with the purpose of en-
abling a person to use it fraudulently in a coin machine 
197 
INSURANCE MARKETING 31A-23-310 
31A-23-309. Representations of agency. 
No person may represent himself as the agent of an insurer unless a written 
agency contract is in effect giving the person authority from the insurer. 
History. C. 1953, 31A-23-309, enacted by 
k 1985, ch. 242, § 28. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
QJJS. — 44 C J.S Insurance § 145 et seq. 
31A-23-310. Trust obligation for funds collected. 
(1) Every agent or broker is a trustee for all funds received or collected as 
an agent or broker for forwarding to insurers or to insureds. Except for 
amounts necessary to pay bank charges, and except for funds paid by insureds 
and belonging in part to the agent or broker as fees or commissions, no agent 
or broker may commingle trust funds with his own funds or with funds held in 
any other capacity. Except as provided under Subsection (4), every agent or 
broker owes to insureds and insurers the fiduciary duties of a trustee with 
resj>ect to money to be forwarded to insurers or insureds through the agent or 
broker. Unless the funds are sent to the appropriate payee by the close of the 
next business day after their receipt, the licensee shall deposit them in an 
account authorized under Subsection (2). Funds so deposited shall remain in 
an account authorized under Subsection (2) until sent to the appropriate 
payee. 
(2) Funds required to be deposited under Subsection (1) shall be deposited: 
(a) in a federally insured trust account with a financial institution 
located in this state; or ' 
(b) in some other account, approved by the commissioner by rule or 
order, providing safety comparable to federally insured trust accounts. 
(S) It is not a violation of Subsection (2)(a) if the amounts in the accounts 
exceed the amount of the federal insurance on the accounts. 
(4) A trust account into which funds are deposited may be interest bearing. 
Except as provided under Subsection 31A-23-307(2)(b), the interest accrued on 
the account may be paid to the agent or broker, so long as the agent or broker 
otherwise complies with this section and with the contract with the insurer. 
(5) No financial institution or other organization holding trust funds under 
this section may offset or impound trust account funds against debts and 
obligations incurred by the agent or broker. 
(6) Any licensee who, not being lawfully entitled thereto, diverts or appro-
priates any portion of the funds held under Subsection (1) to his own use, is 
guilty of theft under Part 4 of Chapter 6, Title 76. Section 76-6-412 applies in 
determining the classification of the offense. Sanctions under Section 
31A-2-308 also apply. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-23-310, enacted by 
L. 1085, ch. 242, § 28; 1986, ch. 204, $ 201. 
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